Doom Thesis
The promises are long dated. The refinancing is not.
Gross federal debt, Social Security and Medicare shortfalls—measured against the households and companies expected to carry them.
A falsifiable thesis, not a mood.
The Doom Thesis is a chain of contentions intended to inform long/short equity, macro, and cryptocurrency investing. The index measures how strongly the current evidence supports that regime.
Simply put
Structural malinvestment and political transfers have created a fiscal burden that requires decisive adjustment unless AI produces extraordinary economy-wide productivity. The thesis remains intact while that productivity escape is unlikely, capital and attention continue to accrue to distraction rather than broad business productivity, and a politically plausible fiscal settlement remains absent.
The live number is an evidence score built from fixed thresholds, not a probability. Higher readings mean the measured fiscal, productivity, political, institutional, and market evidence is more consistent with the thesis.
What drives the score
The six sections below explain what the index measures, the latest reading, how much it contributes to the score, and where the number comes from.
01
Fiscal constraintThe United States has a structural fiscal gap that cannot be closed painlessly under consensus growth.
20% weight
63 score · 100% coverage
partial
Debt, interest, and promised-program funding are growing faster than the ordinary tax base. Stabilization requires unusually strong growth, materially higher revenue, benefit reform, inflation, or some combination.
Score from debt and deficit trajectories, interest burden, program-gap annual equivalent, and the size of the recurring adjustment required to reach the prudent scenario. The unified-deficit input scores 0 at 3% of GDP or less and 100 at 8% or more, so persistent deficits near 6% register as material stress rather than safety.
Component score: 63.4/100 at 100.0% input coverage.
The existing daily panel, Trustees estimates, CBO baseline, and security-level Treasury roll model support this.
The page shows the deficit correction and program-gap funding separately to avoid double counting.
The OASDI beneficiary-to-worker series and gross debt/GDP comparison are already present.
The arithmetic is supported; the word “path” requires political and behavioral evidence developed in the political-feasibility component.
02
Productivity escapeRapid productivity acceleration is not yet the base case, and the fiscal escape velocity is far above consensus.
30% weight
82 score · 100% coverage
partial
Ordinary productivity growth is too slow to make the debt and unfunded obligations manageable on its own. The thesis breaks only if AI produces a sustained, economy-wide jump large enough for growth to outrun those obligations.
Combine realized nonfarm-business productivity, forecast distributions, output-per-dollar measures, and the probability of five-year productivity at or above 5%. Lower growth produces a higher Doom score.
Component score: 82.0/100 at 100.0% input coverage.
The existing BLS quarterly and five-year trend series supports the historical statement, not the forward probability.
A daily point-in-time Sharadar bridge now tracks rolling-four-quarter GDP-deflator-adjusted revenue growth, operating-cash-flow margin, and FCF margin for U.S. nonfinancial, nonutility companies outside the score-70+ distraction basket. Current-vintage GDPDEF, mix, acquisitions, entry, and cyclicality prevent a causal AI-productivity interpretation.
Utilities and education are documented descriptively, but the charts do not establish causation.
This is central to the thesis but currently has no decomposed empirical model.
The threshold and research estimator are explicit and reproducible; live execution remains gated on calibration and governance.
03
The distraction economyAI may raise measured capability while reducing human attention, agency, and effective productivity through personalized media and addiction loops.
15% weight
56 score · 100% coverage
partial
Cheaper, more personalized content can consume the time and focus that better tools theoretically save. A productivity model that counts only workplace automation misses this offset.
Measure attention-platform value and cash flow against industrial capacity, observed digital leisure versus socializing, and two explicit weekly Google Trends inputs. The AI Porn/constructive-education 52-week level ratio and their trailing-12-week YoY growth-rate difference each receive 10% of the Distraction component, or 1.5% of the total Doom Index.
Component score: 55.6/100 at 100.0% input coverage.
GLM 5.2 scored all 6,226 active and delisted U.S. Sharadar companies that ever exceeded $1 billion of market capitalization; the prompt, responses, membership, retries, and audit outputs are retained.
The score-70-or-higher basket is compared with all U.S. Industrials using active and delisted membership and each ticker-year's final Sharadar market-cap observation. This is a capital-allocation proxy, not proof of social harm.
The daily comparison uses the core point-in-time ARQ/datekey replay and four distinct calendar quarters; the interpretation still needs business-model and causal controls.
Meta reports a 24% increase in Instagram time spent since Reels, a 7% view lift from Q4 2025 Facebook ranking improvements, and a 20% Threads time-spent lift from recommendation optimizations. These company measurements are not yet a consistent cross-platform or economy-wide causal panel.
BLS ATUS primary-activity data show television plus leisure gaming/computer use at 3.23 hours per day in 2025 versus 2.87 in 2003, while socializing fell from 0.78 to 0.58 hours; the ratio rose about 51%. Concurrent phone use is omitted.
One worldwide grouped Google Trends request places AI Porn, Best Colleges, and Trade School on a shared scale. The 52-week level ratio and the 12-week-average YoY growth differential are separately visible and separately scored at 1.5% of the total index each; English-language term choice, relative normalization, and historical revisions remain explicit caveats.
This needs causal evidence and sensitivity bounds.
04
Political feasibility of adjustmentThe austerity and revenue package required by the fiscal arithmetic is politically infeasible before crisis conditions.
15% weight
86 score · 100% coverage
partial
The arithmetic can identify a bill; it cannot prove Congress will pay it. This component asks whether voters and institutions will accept the required taxes, spending restraint, or benefit changes before markets force the issue.
Combine legislative prediction markets, fiscal-policy polling, roll-call behavior, enacted primary-balance changes, and independent budget scores. Lower probability of timely adjustment produces a higher score.
Component score: 86.2/100 at 100.0% input coverage.
Will U.S. federal deficit-to-GDP for FY2026 be below 5%? ↗ trades at roughly 10%. It asks only whether the FY2026 deficit falls below 5% of GDP—not whether Congress passes the much larger recurring adjustment modeled here.
The live model scores required adjustment/GDP, the tax-only receipts increase, projected deficit persistence, and a disclosed 1.73% base-rate estimate of timely sufficient enactment with a 0.15%-6.0% sensitivity range. This is a model, not proof of infeasibility.
Across seven major laws with contemporaneous CBO/JCT scores since 2011, none reaches the 8.33%-of-GDP recurring prudent adjustment on a simple annualized budget-window basis. The largest deficit-reducing precedent, the 2011 Budget Control Act, is about 1.33% of enactment-year GDP—roughly one-sixth of the required scale—and later laws modified its caps.
Gallup reports 79% worried a great deal or fair amount about federal spending in 2026, while its 2025 question found 39% favoring and 57% opposing significant Social Security and Medicare cost changes. These are separate questions and are not a calibrated package-passage probability.
Production Kalshi and Polymarket clients now paginate discovery, flatten all event markets, read executable order books, preserve native units, and archive hashed raw responses. The live Kalshi FY2026 deficit/GDP-below-5% contract was 9% bid / 11% ask on 2026-08-04; because it resolves a different event, it is corroborating evidence rather than a substitute for the enactment model.
This requires historical base rates and observable policy probabilities.
05
Debasement and financial repressionIf explicit adjustment fails, policymakers will lean on inflation, money creation, captive demand, and digital financial control.
10% weight
16 score · 100% coverage
partial
The bill can be paid visibly through taxes and cuts or less visibly through lower real returns on money and bonds. Digital rails may increase the state's ability to target, monitor, or restrict that adjustment—but that outcome is not automatic.
Track inflation expectations, term premium and rate volatility, central-bank balance sheets, real yields, Treasury ownership, regulatory captive-demand measures, and concrete U.S. digital-money policy milestones.
Component score: 16.3/100 at 100.0% input coverage.
The incentive is plausible and historically grounded, but the current page lacks a regime model.
The latest matched 10-year real yield is positive and the coded U.S. panel contains no current broad capital-control or asset-confiscation law. Fed ownership is 14.8% of the constructed market-facing debt denominator; this is a diagnostic, not proof of compelled private demand.
No current U.S. policy path or conditional probability is supplied.
Breakevens, 5y5y inflation, real yields, term premium, Fed assets, M2, and MOVE are wired with thresholds and currently populated. The August 4 refresh used a visibly disclosed delayed-quote fallback for MOVE because the Bloomberg bridge timed out; the causal regime transition is not established.
The term requires a precise legal and economic definition before it can enter the score.
06
Institutional and economic legitimacyDeclining economic and political legitimacy makes explicit fiscal adjustment harder and increases noncompliance, exit, conflict, and the risk of coercive responses.
10% weight
75 score · 100% coverage
partial
A fiscal settlement requires people to believe the economic and political bargain is legitimate enough to comply with. Trust and administrative capacity are measurable; the transitions from weak legitimacy to noncompliance, conflict, and coercion are not yet established.
Use political and economic trust, perceived fairness and mobility, tax and payment compliance, verified fraud and corruption, capital flight, democratic governance, protest and unrest, executive power, surveillance, and civil-liberty indicators with predeclared thresholds.
Component score: 74.6/100 at 100.0% input coverage.
The page reports the Pew history and latest level.
The fixed Gallup 14-institution average is 26.9% in 2026 versus 37.8% in its first fully populated year, 1993. Congress is 9%, the Supreme Court 27%, banks 28%, big business 17%, newspapers 17%, and television news 14%; these are survey attitudes, not direct performance measures.
CMS improper payments are measured, but CMS explicitly says they are not a fraud estimate.
V-Dem v16 reports the U.S. liberal-democracy index at 0.571 in 2025, down 0.228 from 2004; Freedom House reports 81/100, down 12 points. Legislative constraints, expression, human rights, and judicial constraints also decline in the panel. These expert-coded, overlapping measures warrant a deterioration signal, not an inevitable-authoritarianism forecast.
Democracy, civil-liberty, executive-constraint, centralization, court-authorized-intercept, current local-surveillance, and 2017–2025 political-crowd diagnostics now exist. CCC event count rose 260% from 2017 to 2025, but reported serious harm or property damage fell to 0.35% of events from 1.01%; arrests are kept separate. Court-authorized intercepts fell 58.2% from their 2015 publication-series peak. The evidence does not yet establish a broad political-violence trend or a calibrated authoritarian transition probability.
This is a scenario requiring signposts, not a warranted current-state claim.
The Distraction Economy versus Industrials
The distraction index contains companies whose revenue benefits directly when people spend more time on digital entertainment, social feeds, games, gambling, and targeted advertising. The industrial comparison is the Sharadar Industrials sector.
Currently traded: —
Historical and delisted companies included in the charts: —
A company enters this index when its classifier score is at least 70/100. The membership list is fixed as of July 31, 2026 and applied backward to the company’s public-market history. Download constituents and company-level explanations ↓
Expected profit pools
Cash generation
AI Porn versus constructive education
Current level ratio: —. Trailing-12-week YoY growth: — for AI Porn versus — for constructive education. Equal-weight attention-allocation score: —.
Digital leisure versus socializing
Sources: Sharadar DAILY market cap and point-in-time ARQ filings, including delisted U.S. companies; BLS American Time Use Survey; DataForSEO Google Trends. The 2026 classifier is applied retrospectively, so the company charts are descriptive rather than an implementable historical portfolio. ATUS measures only the primary activity, omits simultaneous phone use, and has no annual 2020 estimate. Google Trends is a relative, revisable index and the worldwide English-language terms are attention proxies—not enrollment or consumption. Download the weekly search panel ↓
This is what it would take to right-size the fiscal and monetary situation in the United States.
Bring the annual deficit down to 3% of GDP and reduce the Social Security and Medicare funding gap to one year of GDP without cutting promised benefits. On current math, that means a recurring — annual adjustment—or economic growth fast enough to make the bill small. The tax-led base case is a lower-growth, lower-valuation transition, not a painless accounting fix. This is why AGI moon math is so appealing: extraordinary productivity is the only believable non-austerity route that lets the country honor the promises without some combination of huge taxes, benefit cuts, inflation, or financial repression. But it has to be a sustained change in the growth regime, not a one-year AI boom.
- The bill: New recurring resources equal — of GDP, taking federal receipts from 17.5% to —. The program-funding leg lasts 75 years.
- Base-case economy and stocks: In CBO experiments of comparable scale, the GDP level ends up — below baseline after ten years. The modeled corporate-rate change alone cuts after-tax earnings roughly —; adding a modest 10%–20% P/E de-rating implies a mechanical — equity-value loss. A recessionary implementation could be worse.
- What consensus expects: The IMF projects U.S. real growth of — in 2026/27; CBO settles near — long run. IMF global growth is —, while the World Bank is at —.
- The AGI growth hurdle: To dilute today’s program gap from 297% to 100% of GDP through growth alone requires real GDP/productivity growth of — / — over 10 years, — / — over 20 years, or — / — over 30 years. Each range assumes the gap grows between 0% and 2% real annually.
- Plain English: The central 20-year case needs 5.6%–7.7% real GDP growth and 5.2%–7.3% productivity growth every year—roughly two to four times the U.S. baseline. Anything less still leaves a large bill for taxpayers, beneficiaries, or holders of dollars and bonds.
Growth forecasts: IMF July 2026, World Bank June 2026, and CBO 2026–2036. Economic-impact comparison: CBO tax-financing scenarios. The AGI hurdle is a denominator sensitivity, not a forecast or proof that growth itself funds the remaining gap.
Download AGI growth sensitivity ↓ LLM-readable text →The bill
Present-value estimates are stocks. Income and interest are annual flows. The ratios deliberately show how many current income-years sit beneath the obligation.
What sits behind the headline
| Liability | Total | Per household | Definition |
|---|
Cumulative public-company profit versus debt added
Trillions since 2000; earnings enter when quarterly filings become public
The income series is point-in-time and survivorship-safe: U.S. domestic common stocks enter only during their public pricing windows; delisted companies remain in history; each ARQ filing adds that quarter’s net income, and later restatements add only the revision delta. The 2026 point includes filings through July 31.
Download daily cumulative CSV ↓More obligation, per household
The relevant income benchmark is survey income—not a national-accounts aggregate divided by household count.
Total U.S. liabilities
Nominal trillions of dollars
Liability income-years
Per-household liability divided by mean after-tax income
Liabilities versus household income
| Year | Total liabilities | Per household | Mean after-tax income | Income-years | Status |
|---|
Interest versus discretionary income
Discretionary income means after-tax income left after food at home, housing, transportation, healthcare, and insurance and pensions.
of household discretionary income
Federal interest was — against an estimated — nationwide discretionary-income pool.
of the latest measured pool
Federal interest is now approximately — per household, holding the latest measured discretionary-income benchmark constant.
The average hides the distribution
The 2026 interest allocation per household is roughly half of the middle quintile’s entire measured discretionary income. This is a scale comparison, not a literal household bill.
The refinancing arrives
The projection replays Treasury’s security-level maturity schedule at the current curve and follows public-debt targets from the federal baseline.
The first number is a current cash outlay. The second converts the Social Security and Medicare present-value gaps into a level 75-year real payment at the Trustees’ 2.3% intermediate real discount rate. They answer different questions; together they show the annual economic funding burden if the promises are honored without allowing the gaps to compound.
Annual fiscal burden versus U.S. public-company net income
Each historical Social Security and Medicare present-value gap is converted using the same 2.3% real, 75-year annuity factor
| Year | Interest | Annualized gaps | Combined | Public net income | Interest / NI | Combined / NI |
|---|
Ratios are not meaningful in 2009 because aggregate public-company net income was negative. The 2026 point uses the current-curve interest model and rolling four-quarter company income.
Federal net interest versus U.S. public-company net income
Annual trillions; company income is point-in-time rolling four-quarter Sharadar data
Original principal coming due
Trillions by fiscal year; cumulative share of the starting portfolio
Interest burden, 2026–2030
| Year | Interest | Public net income | Ratio |
|---|
More capital, modest output
Physical power, human capital, corporate cash conversion, and economy-wide output per hour expose different layers of productivity. Together they show where spending and investment are—and are not—turning into measurable output.
Utility capital investment versus U.S. power generation
Sharadar U.S. Utilities-sector capex compared with EIA total generation across all sectors
Completed calendar years are followed by a 2026 live point using rolling-four-quarter Sharadar capex and trailing-12-month EIA generation. This is a system-level capital-intensity measure, not a levelized cost of electricity. Sharadar Utilities includes gas, water, and multi-utilities; EIA generation includes independent, commercial, and industrial generators.
Education spending versus demonstrated learning
Census current spending per public-school pupil versus national-public grade-8 NAEP reading and mathematics
By 2024, real current spending per pupil was — above 2003 while the grade-8 reading/math score index was — below 2003. Normalizing NAEP scores permits a visual comparison; it does not mean the scale measures “percent knowledge,” and this chart is descriptive rather than a causal estimate.
More credentials. Weaker measured mastery. A narrower first rung.
The system is issuing more successful-looking credentials while external assessments have weakened and high-productivity employers are investing much less in beginner talent. The last step is partly a labor-demand shock—not a pure verdict on schools—but it reduces the apprenticeship capacity that turns education into experienced human capital.
Public-school graduation, 2011–12 to 2021–22. Over a similar period, ACT-taker GPA rose from — to —. Neither is a fixed national mastery standard.
ACT composite, 2015 to 2025. Broader school-day testing explains much of the aggregate decline, but its more comparable mean also fell from — to —.
New graduates’ share of 2024 Big Tech hires. SignalFire’s latest report estimates entry-level hiring is — below 2019 at Tech Majors and — below 2019 at early-stage startups.
SignalFire’s proprietary Beacon AI tracks professional profiles and organizations. Its company universes and definitions changed between the 2025 and 2026 reports. The latest report also finds graduates from top-20 U.S. computer-science programs were — less likely to enter a Tech Major in 2025 than the 2022 class. This is evidence of a broken school-to-work conversion channel, not proof that weaker student performance caused the hiring contraction; AI automation, post-ZIRP normalization, and leaner organizational design also matter.
Real revenue growth and cash conversion outside distraction
Point-in-time rolling four quarters; U.S. public operating companies excluding score-70+ distraction businesses
Latest: — FCF margin, up — year over year, across — companies with the same four quarters of revenue and cash-flow data. Real growth uses the latest publicly available current-vintage GDP deflator. This is a broad operating-outcome bridge—not a causal AI-productivity estimate—because mix, M&A, entry, and cyclicality also move it.
Output-per-hour growth
Completed annual averages through 2025, followed by the latest 2026 quarter
The 2026 point is not a partial-year average: it is the latest quarter’s year-over-year growth and the five-year CAGR measured against the same quarter five years earlier.
When ordinary life pays less
The proposed bridge is behavioral: when housing, education, and basic stores of value move farther from ordinary earnings—and health and family-formation outcomes stagnate—offline life becomes less rewarding. That can increase the appeal of personalized distraction. These indicators measure the pressure; they do not, by themselves, prove that it causes distraction demand.
What changed since 2006 and since 1976?
Every indicator uses the same requested windows when its definition and source permit it. Missing history stays visibly unavailable.
| Indicator | Current | Since 2006 | Since 1976 |
|---|
For periodic surveys, the named survey cycle spanning the anchor is used. No interpolation, retrospective IWM-membership substitution, or silent change in population definition is permitted.
Actual mortgage payment burden
Annual principal and interest on a 30-year fixed mortgage, divided by median household income
This is a financing comparison, not a full ownership-cost index: it omits property tax, insurance, maintenance, and the existing-home mix. The result does not say 1976 was less affordable: payment burden was 26.6% then versus 27.9% now. The price itself rose from — to — median household incomes; 1976's 8.87% mortgage rate offset part of that price gap. The 2026 income denominator scales official 2024 Census household income by BLS median nominal weekly-earnings growth.
Big Macs purchasable per median work hour
A concrete wage-purchasing-power proxy using nominal median full-time earnings
A 1976 Columbus, Nebraska McDonald’s menu lists a Big Mac at 75¢; BLS’s May 1976 CPS table reports $4.26 median usual hourly earnings, implying 5.68 Big Macs per hour. That point is a location-and-worker-population proxy, not a national average. The comparable 2000+ line uses The Economist’s U.S. price observations and BLS median full-time weekly earnings divided by 40.
One company is larger than the small-cap market
iShares supplies the current IWM constituent list; Sharadar supplies each matched company’s full market capitalization. IWM’s — of ETF assets is shown only as a cross-check and is not used as “Russell 2000 market cap.” Current membership is not a point-in-time historical backtest.
How much of one median household income?
| Item | Price | Income-years | % of one income |
|---|
Harvard and Penn are tuition-only sticker prices before aid, fees, room, or board. “One bar” means one troy-ounce investment bar. Gold and oil use front-month futures as tradable price proxies. Every ratio uses the latest official 2024 median household income of —, so it is a gross-income comparison—not a claim that households pay these prices from one year’s cash flow.
Health and family-formation trajectories
Life expectancy, suicide, measured adult obesity, and completed fertility among native-born women
Life expectancy and the comparable ages-20–74 obesity series use 1976 baselines. The CDC suicide dashboard begins in 2001, and the comparable CPS native-born completed-fertility series begins in 2014, so those series use their first observations. Birth certificates do not identify U.S.-born or citizen mothers. The CPS measure answers the nativity question directly but is lagging: it records completed births among native-born women ages 40–50, not the current-year birth rate.
A structural deficit on a narrowing base
World War II left a gross federal debt equal to 114% of GDP, but demobilization and rapid nominal growth cut that ratio by more than half within 15 years. Today the debt stock is higher than the wartime level and sits beneath a mature pay-as-you-go transfer system with fewer covered workers supporting each beneficiary.
More beneficiaries for every 100 covered workers
Old-age, survivor, and disability beneficiaries in current-payment status relative to workers with OASDI-covered earnings
The 1945 ratio is not a clean steady-state demographic benchmark: ongoing monthly Social Security benefits had begun only in 1940, and coverage expanded materially in the 1950s. The mature-system comparison is more defensible from roughly 1960 onward. “Beneficiaries” is broader than “pensioners” because OASDI also includes survivors and disabled workers.
The wartime debt ratio came back
| Year | Gross debt / GDP | Beneficiaries / 100 workers | Workers / beneficiary | Interpretation |
|---|
Gross federal debt fell from — of GDP in 1945 to — in 1960 as wartime spending ended and nominal GDP expanded. By 2025 it was ——above the WWII level—while the mature OASDI support ratio had deteriorated from 5.1 workers per beneficiary in 1960 to 2.6. The ratio does not prove insolvency by itself; it shows why stabilizing the same debt stock is harder when each worker supports more beneficiaries.
Download demographics CSV ↓The revenue is annual. The destruction is capitalized.
A static return to the 1968–1969 federal corporate rate raises a flow of tax receipts by permanently reducing the earnings stream capitalized into equity value.
Total federal receipts versus outlays
Tax collections and other receipts compared with total federal spending
Where federal receipts come from
| Source | Amount | Share |
|---|
Corporate income taxes are only — of projected federal receipts. “Total receipts” includes taxes, customs duties, and the smaller other-receipts category.
The federal collection and spending ledger
| FY | Receipts | Outlays | Deficit | Spending covered | Status |
|---|
What it costs to unwind the gap
“Reasonable” is defined here as reducing the current deficit to 3% of GDP while shrinking the combined Social Security and Medicare 75-year funding gap from almost three years of GDP to one—not forcing it to zero.
Choose the residual risk
| Endpoint | Residual program gap | Annual deficit fix | Annual program funding | Total adjustment | Tax-only receipts / GDP | Per household |
|---|
Timing matters: this is not a fresh 8.3%-of-GDP tax increase every year. After phase-in, tax rates remain at the higher level and generate the recurring real payment each year. The program-funding component lasts 75 years; the deficit correction must be maintained and updated as the budget and economy evolve.
The selected prudent course requires — of annual program-gap funding in addition to the current-deficit correction. The per-household figure is a scale equivalent, not a proposal for a uniform household tax.
Funding split sensitivity—not a reform proposal
| PV reform share | Required PV reduction | New taxes | Total receipts / GDP | All income brackets | Combined payroll | Top gains + NIIT | Corporate | VAT |
|---|
The 10% row means that an actual, independently scored policy package would have to reduce the 75-year gap PV by the displayed amount. Its annual-equivalent is shown only to make the stock comparable with annual taxes. It is not a current benefit cut, and this table cannot establish whether any reform is non-catastrophic; that requires specifying timing, cohorts, benefit formulas, eligibility, premiums, and healthcare-payment changes.
The tax columns are a separate sensitivity that linearly scales JCT marginal scores. Large simultaneous hikes would produce nonlinear avoidance and macroeconomic feedback, so they are optimistic revenue estimates.
Do not add this program funding benchmark to a separate 75-year unified-deficit present value: Social Security and Medicare gaps already overlap with future federal deficits. This construction combines only a current-year deficit target with prospective prefunding.
Download funding endpoints ↓ Download sustainable tax mixes ↓Deficit relief versus equity repricing
Annual fiscal flows on the left; capitalized equity stock on the right
Earnings loss plus de-rating
| P/E change | Equity loss | Loss % | Value lost / tax $ |
|---|
This deliberately aggressive static scenario applies the 31.8-point federal statutory-rate increase to positive book pretax income. It does not model deductions, foreign-source rules, credits, loss offsets, behavioral response, or the lower tax base that follows weaker investment and activity.
Free-cash-flow yield versus the 30-year
Annual endpoints from a daily point-in-time FCF reconstruction
The FCF numerator requires four reported quarters; the market-cap denominator includes the full nonfinancial, nonutility universe. Missing fundamentals therefore bias the displayed FCF yield downward.
SPX earnings yield versus VCLT yield
Bloomberg annual endpoints; VCLT yield history begins in 2018
Definitions matter
What the total includes
—
What “unfunded” means
Social Security and Medicare are changing 75-year present-value projection gaps, not fixed bonds or legal invoices. They move with demographics, benefits, taxes, healthcare costs and discount rates.
What income means
—
What the ratio means
—